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Abstract The Obama administration has confronted a formidable array of obstacles
in implementing the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA has overcome those obsta-
cles to substantially expand access to health insurance, though significant problems
with its approach have emerged.What does theACA’s performance to date tell us about
the possibilities and limits of health care reform in the United States? I identify key
challenges in ACA implementation—the inherently disruptive nature of reform, par-
tisan polarization, the limits of “near universal” coverage, complexity, and divided
public opinion—and analyze how these issues have shaped its evolution. The article
concludes by exploring the political and policy challenges that lie ahead for the ACA.
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Passage of the 2010Patient Protection andAffordableCareAct (ACA)was
a remarkable political feat. The Obama administration and congressional
Democrats beat the odds, reversing a long record of disappointment and
failure in health reform. They surmounted multiple hurdles that easily
could have tripped up reformers once again, themost treacherous being the
loss of a filibuster-proof Senate supermajority following Ted Kennedy’s
death and Scott Brown’s subsequent election (Brown 2011; Cohn 2010;
Jacobs and Skocpol 2010; McDonough 2011).
Yet if the ACA’s enactment proved that substantial health reform was
indeed possible to legislate in the United States, the past six years have
demonstrated how difficult it is to implement such reform. The Obama
administration and its allies have faced a formidable array of implementation
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challenges: establishing myriad new institutions, promulgating and enforc-
ing numerous regulations, getting a complicated insurance enrollment
system up and running across the country, educating tens of millions of
potential enrollees about the law’s benefits, and initiating a plethora of
experiments in payment and delivery system reform. Moreover, imple-
mentation also has (or in some cases, should have) entailed efforts to build a
political constituency for the ACA, reassure a confused and anxious public
about Obamacare’s impact, and persuade reluctant and sometimes hostile
state policy makers to participate in the reform project.
How has the Obama administration fared in meeting these challenges?
What does the ACA’s performance to date tell us about the promise and
limits of health care reform?Andhowmight theACA’s trajectory change in
coming years? David Mechanic (1994: 44) noted long ago that “it is far
too easy to construct a utopian health care system that has no possibility
of implementation.” The ACA offers a window into the real world of
implementation. Because the law aims to domany things—expand access
to health coverage, control health care spending, transform medical care
payment and delivery, and more—it is impossible to cover all of those
policy domains in this space. I focus here on the challenges associatedwith
the ACA’s efforts to increase access to health insurance and on the political
dynamics that have shaped its implementation.
Transformative Incrementalism
The ACA reflected a political theory of health reform that illuminates
much about its postenactment achievements and tribulations. Democrats’
autopsy on the Clinton administration’s disastrous 1993–94 health reform
campaign concluded that it died in part due to an excessively ambitious
plan. It alienated already insured, middle-class Americans who worried
that reform would worsen their access to medical care and health system
stakeholders who feared that the plan would hurt them financially. Public
support for the Clinton plan plummeted, and it attracted only tepid backing
from congressional Democrats while drawing intense Republican oppo-
sition (Hacker 1996; Johnson and Broder 1997; Skocpol 1996).
The Clinton plan’s demise seared a number of lessons in Democrats and
reformers’ collective consciousness that the Obama administration and
Congress would apply during 2009–10 (Hacker 2011; Oberlander 2010).
Among them was the prime directive of health reform: do not disturb the
existing insurance system and the already insured. Most Americans were
insured, liked their current arrangements, and presumably wanted to keep
their plans. Moreover, various formidable interests—insurers, employers,
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the medical care industry, and states—were invested in the prevailing
order. The further a reform plan departed from the status quo, according to
this perspective, the more it risked losing support from the public and
stakeholders. It mattered not that this (non)system was inefficient, ineq-
uitable, and irrational, comprising a patchwork of insurance plans that
determined eligibility on the basis of age, occupation, and, as Medicare’s
universal coverage of end-stage kidney disease embodied, even the health
of particular organs. Politics dictated building on the status quo and reas-
suring the insured. Massachusetts’s 2006 health care law, which passed
with strong bipartisan support, appeared to offer confirmatory evidence for
this approach (McDonough 2011).
Obamacare thus began with the proposition that substantial reform leg-
islation could become law only if it left asmuch of existing arrangements in
place as possible. The ACA retained the three long-standing major foun-
dations of insurance in the United States—employer-sponsored coverage,
Medicare, and Medicaid (Hacker 2011; Jost 2014a; Starr 2011; Tuohy
2011). Most Americans were expected to keep their health plans after the
ACA’s onset. The uninsured were to be covered through expansions of
familiar institutions, Medicaid and private insurance, though the estab-
lishment of health insurance exchanges did represent a key innovation.
The ACA is an ambitious law. The regulation of private insurance,
establishment of subsides for the uninsured to buy coverage through new
purchasing pools, expansion of Medicaid, requirements on employers to
offer and individuals to obtain insurance, introduction of delivery and
payment system changes, andmuchmoremark the ACA as transformative
public policy. But the way that the ACA seeks to expand insurance cov-
erage is incremental. The ACA does not create a new health insurance
model so much as it patches the existing patchwork system (Marmor and
Oberlander 2011; Tuohy 2011).
Implementing Disruption
Judged by the outcome of the 2009–10 health care debate, the political
theory of transformative incrementalism was a resounding success. Less
was indeed more, as the Obama administration avoided fighting a multi-
front war against the health care industry and enough Democrats in the
House and Senate held together to pass landmark legislation (notably,
though, the administration did not win the public opinion battle despite
reformers’ concerted efforts to assuage the insured). However, the ACA’s
implementation has underscored the limits of building on the status quo.
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Health care reform is inherently disruptive (Feder 2014). Real reformmea-
sures make changes and alter current arrangements; that, after all, is the
point of reform. If the status quo ante worked well, it wouldn’t require
change.
The Obama administration tried tominimize disruption by leavingmost
Americans in place, as reflected in President Barack Obama’s promise that
“if you like your plan, you can keep it” (Feder 2014). The president’s line
echoed the message emphasized by pro-reform pollsters that such an
assurancewould giveAmericans “peace ofmind” (Lake Research Partners
and the HerndonAlliance 2009). The problem is that minimal disruption is
not the same as no disruption. The ACA actually did not promise to pre-
serve plans on the nongroup market that were altered or purchased after
2010. Yet the fate of persons who already had coverage on the individ-
ual insurance market did not garner much attention during the 2009–10
health care debate, perhaps because that market encompassed only about
5 percent of Americans. Many health policy analysts viewed the non-
groupmarket as highly dysfunctional, administratively expensive, unfair to
persons with preexisting conditions, replete with inadequate “bare bones”
plans, and unstable, with most persons who purchased such policies no
longer in them after two years (Sommers 2014). Because of those prob-
lems, theACAalways intended to radically overhaul the individualmarket.
Indeed, a central rationale for reform was the inability of the uninsured to
obtain affordable coverage through this market.
However, a component of the insurance system that encompasses only 5
percent of the US population still amounts to about 15 million persons.
Some of those persons had individually purchased policies that offered
comprehensive benefits at reasonable costs, and they liked their plans.
Others had limited coverage full of benefit holes but did not understand
well those limits. Consequently, when insurers announced in the fall of
2013 that they were canceling several million individual policies in
response to the ACA’s new benefit and rating requirements, it created a
political firestorm (Clemans-Cope and Anderson 2015; Jost 2014a). The
president’s promise that Americans could keep their health plans was
broken.
In a political system that rewarded honesty,Obamacould have explained
during 2009–10 that no health reform can guarantee that literally all
Americans keep their current plans. The pre-ACA status quo in fact
guaranteed that many persons would be forced to change plans or lose
coverage altogether. He could have further noted that the real test of reform
is not whether everyone stays in their plan or all Americans pay less, have
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better coverage, and believe they are better off—tests any reform pro-
posal would inevitably fail—but howmanyAmericanswould be better off
under reform relative to thosewho have to paymore or involuntarily switch
plans. He could have emphasized that the vast majority of persons would
remain in their plans after theACA’s implementation.Our electoral system,
though, does not reward nuance or forthrightness. Policy makers trying
to secure the passage of controversial legislation have strong political
incentives to downplay the costs and redistributive implications of their
reform, while talking up its benefits (Oberlander and Weaver 2015).
The firestormover insurance cancellations—seized on and amplified by
ACA critics—eventually forced theObama administration to backtrack as
states were given the authority to decide whether to permit such plans to
continue until 2014 (a transitional reprieve later extended to 2017). By the
fall of 2014, forty states had adopted measures to enable renewal of non-
compliant plans on the individual and small groupmarkets (Luca, Corlette,
andWilliams 2014). Cancellations in 2014 were far less numerous than in
2013 (Clemans-Cope and Anderson 2015). But the political damage had
already been done. The episode highlighted how difficult it is to reorder
even the smallest slice of the US insurance system. It also demonstrated
why politicians have an incentive to oversell health reform’s adherence to
the status quo—and the political risks of doing so.
Partisan Divide
TheACA passed on partisan lines, with no Republicans voting for the final
bill. Still, Democrats had reason to believe that the ACA could broaden its
political base over time.Medicare, too, had been controversial and partisan
before the program’s enactment, after which the GOP quickly accommo-
dated to its popularity among beneficiaries and the wider public. Not-
withstanding the rhetoric about a “government takeover” of the health care
system, the ACA containedmany elements that were in theory palatable to
the Republicans and had in fact been part of prior GOP health plans:
reliance on private insurance, an individual mandate, consumer choice and
competition, health insurance purchasing pools, and a major role for states
(Quadagno 2014). Those elements failed to attract any Republican con-
gressional support for the ACA during 2009–10. ACA supporters were
nonetheless hopeful that as the law’s benefits took hold and the heated
rhetoric subsided, the GOPwould accept that Obamacare was here to stay.
Moreover, Republican-led states whose governors and legislatures were
enamored with the prospect of federal dollars might take a more pragmatic
view and rediscover the law’s conservative virtues.
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Yet six years after the ACA’s enactment, the partisan fight over health
reform raged on, in Congress, state legislatures, and the courts. From the
beginning, theACA’s path to potential postenactment bipartisanship got off
to a rocky start as twenty-six states joined a lawsuit challenging its con-
stitutionality. The law’s reliance on states for implementation backfired
as Republicans and conservative groups who had not been able to stop
the ACA’s passage through Congress now had the opportunity to open up
additional fronts of resistance across the country (Starr 2011).
Partisanship in the politics of ACA implementation emerged unex-
pectedly in the major policies designed to expand coverage to the unin-
sured: health insurance exchanges and Medicaid expansion. Initially, all
states took federal grants to establish exchanges, which enjoyed strong
public support and had been featured in Republican health plans (Jones,
Bradley, andOberlander 2014).However, resistance to taking federal funds
for Obamacare grew among Republicans after the 2010 elections, which
produced sizable GOP gains in both states andCongress, and the rise of the
Tea Party (Jost 2014a). Exchanges became so politically fraught—back in
2010 few had anticipated this level of state resistance—that the Obama
administration renamed them “marketplaces,” which failed to quell con-
troversy. In the end, only seventeen states and the District of Columbia
established their own health insurance exchanges prior to the ACA’s inau-
gural 2013 enrollment period, leaving the federal government to operate
the exchanges across most of the country. Exchange politics were largely
though not exclusively partisan. In the thirty states with Republican gov-
ernors, only four created exchanges (Jones,Bradley, andOberlander 2014).
Undermining the ACA by refusing to set up exchanges appeared to be
a futile strategy: it gave liberals what they had wanted in the first place,
federal control over insurance marketplaces, without seriously damaging
Obamacare. The strategy seemed prescient, though, when the Obama
administration oversaw an abysmal rollout ofHealthCare.gov—the online
enrollment platform to obtain coverage in states without their own
exchanges. The juxtaposition of HealthCare.gov’s troubled start that pre-
vented Americans whowanted insurance from obtaining it with individual
insurance policy cancellations that caused some persons who wanted to
keep their coverage to lose it was an extraordinarily bad (albeit short-lived)
moment for the Obama administration. States’ refusal to cooperate with
Washington ended up magnifying the consequences of an implementation
fiasco that enhanced Washington’s reputation for incompetence, raised
serious questions about the federal government’s administrative capac-
ity, damaged public perception of the law, and temporarily stunted ACA
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enrollment in many states. Furthermore, the subsequent emergence of a
serious legal challenge to the availability of health insurance subsidies in
states with federally facilitated marketplaces unexpectedly offered oppo-
nents the prospect of dealing amore grievous blow to exchange enrollment
and the ACA’s insurance expansion.
As states resisted creating health insurance marketplaces, Medicaid
became another focus of opposition. The 2012 Supreme Court ruling
upholding the constitutionality of the individual mandate also effectively
made Medicaid expansion optional for states. Still, Medicaid already
operated in all fifty states, meaning that unlike with exchanges, no
accommodationwith a new institutionwas required. The lure of substantial
federal money (with Washington initially paying 100 percent of the costs
for new Medicaid eligibles, before phasing down to 90 percent in perpe-
tuity), as well as political pressure from a hospital industry with a strong
financial stake in reducing uncompensated care was widely expected to
persuade state policy makers to accede to its expansion.
There has in fact been more bipartisanship on Medicaid than on insur-
ance marketplaces, perhaps because states stand to gain (and lose) much
more money from expanding Medicaid than from establishing exchanges.
It is one thing to mount symbolic opposition to Obamacare; it is something
else to oppose it in a way that deprives a state of considerable resources.
As of February 2016, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia had
expanded Medicaid, including ten states led by GOP governors (KFF
2016a; Rose 2015). But of the nineteen states that have so far declined to
expand, eighteen have Republican governors and the other has a GOP-
majority legislature. The prospect of losing federal funds, hurting hospital
finances, inhibiting the economy, and depriving low-income residents of
insurance coverage has not been enough to convince those resisting states
to relent. Even the Obama administration’s flexibility on Medicaid expan-
sion models—allowing states to use the funds to instead expand private
coverage through the insurance exchanges (Arkansas) or impose cost
sharing on Medicaid enrollees (Iowa and Pennsylvania)—has persuaded
only a handful of additional states to go along.
State resistance to insurance exchanges and Medicaid expansion has
created a variable implementation reality. Some Americans live in states
that have embraced theACAand promoted enrollment inMedicaid and the
health insurance marketplaces (though some states have struggled to
operate their own marketplaces). Others live in states that are double
rejecters and have done nothing to encourage enrollment, complicating the
Obama administration’s and reformers’efforts to reach the uninsured. Such
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conditions have given rise to nongovernmental actors like Enroll America
that seek to fill that outreach void.
Meanwhile, at the federal level the ACA has not followed Medicare’s
inviting script of postenactment political gains.CongressionalRepublicans
have hardly come to accept Obamacare, voting repeatedly for its repeal.
The GOP additionally has refused to participate in nominatingmembers to
the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) that was to help restrain
Medicare spending, effectively blocking its launch (the Obama adminis-
tration has not moved to implement IPAB, but one major reason for that
inaction is Republican resistance). The GOP also has supported multiple
efforts to unravel the law through the courts. The constitutional challenge
to the individualmandate (National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius) was nearly fatal to the ACA, and the Supreme Court’s accom-
panying Medicaid expansion decision blew a sizable hole in the law’s
coverage strategy. The challenge to the legality of the federal govern-
ment providing tax credits to the uninsured in states that did not set up
their own health insurance exchange (King v. Burwell) went further than
most observers expected, imperiling coverage gains in nearly three dozen
states before the Supreme Court sided with the Obama administration in
upholding the subsidies (Bagley 2015). House Republicans additionally
filed suit against the president (House v. Burwell) for exceeding his
executive authority in delaying the ACA’s employer mandate provisions
and providing funds to insurance companies to pay for cost-sharing
reductions for lower-income persons enrolled in exchange plans (Jost
2016). If the courts rule Congress did not authorize such payments, then
insurers “either will have to cease covering marketplace enrollees or dra-
matically increase premiums across the individual market” (Jost 2016: 7).
Even after the administration’s victory in King v. Burwell had evidently
ended the legal threats to Obamacare, court battles continued. The ACA
has proved more vulnerable to legal challenges than its supporters antic-
ipated as the courts effectively became another front in partisan struggles
over health reform.
The depth and persistence of partisan resistance to the ACA is extraor-
dinary, all the more so given just how conservative and limited Obamacare
is in many respects. It is, after all, essentially the same health care model
that a Republican governor, Mitt Romney, agreed to in 2006, one that rests
on private insurance, competition, and federalism. Massachusetts, where
reform enjoyed broad bipartisan support, proved to be a poor predictor of
the political controversy that followed that model both in other states and
Washington.
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That Republican opposition to theACAcontinues over six years after its
enactment has less to do with the law itself than with broader patterns in
American politics. We live in an era of historic and rising levels of partisan
polarization between Democrats and Republicans in Congress, polariza-
tion that is increasing as well at the state level (McCarty, Poole, and
Rosenthal 2006; Shor and McCarty 2011). Such polarization has been
driven largely by a rightward ideological turn among Republican law-
makers as well as by intense competition between the two parties in
a closely contested electoral context (Lee 2009). The ACA, then, was
enacted and is being implemented in a strongly partisan and ideologically
divisive atmosphere. It is no wonder that the law has yet to achieve a sure
political foothold.
The prolonged partisan fight over theACA is not just evident in electoral
politics, court cases, or efforts by congressional Republicans to defund the
law. Partisanship has prevented reformers from remedying the ACA’s
shortcomings and addressing implementation problems. A less polarized
Congress could have agreed to pass legislation clarifying that premium tax
credits were indeed available to the uninsured in federally facilitated
marketplaces. It could have explicitly authorized funds for the law’s cost-
sharing subsidies that make medical care affordable for low-income per-
sons. It could have addressed the staggering inequity that, in states that have
rejected Medicaid expansion, several million low-income Americans lack
any viable insurance option. It could have fixed the “family glitch” that is
depriving many Americans of affordable insurance options (more on that
later). And it could have possibly agreed on an alternative to the law’s
unwieldy employer mandate that is increasingly out of favor even among
ACA supporters (Blumberg, Holahan, and Buettgens 2014). But none of
this has happened. The partisan divide has made ACA politics an all or
nothing, existential affair. Consequently, sensible reforms of and signifi-
cant revisions to the ACA await a more conducive political climate.
Near (or Not So Near) Universal Coverage
Despite partisan resistance and contested implementation, the ACA has
already reduced the uninsured population substantially, with additional
gains expected in coming years. A range of different surveys all have found
a sizable increase in persons having health insurance since full imple-
mentation of the ACA’s coverage provisions (Blumenthal, Abrams, and
Nuzum 2015). The Urban Institute reports that “fifteen million nonelderly
adults gained coverage between September 2013 and March 2015 as the
uninsurance rate fell from 17.6 percent to 10.1 percent” (Long et al. 2015).
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The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National Health
Interview Survey similarly found that between January and March 2015,
the uninsured rate for all ages at the time of interview stood at 9.2 percent,
down from 14.4 percent in 2013 (Cohen and Martinez 2015). Between
2010 and 2015, the CDC estimates that the number of persons without
health insurance declined from 48.6 million to 28.8 million (Martinez,
Cohen, and Zammitti 2016). While ACA provisions certainly have played
a major role in reducing the uninsured rate, other factors such as the
business cycle and improving economy also may have affected coverage
(Long et al. 2015).
By February 2016, 12.7 million Americans had signed up for or reen-
rolled in health plans through the ACA’s insurance marketplaces (Levitt
et al. 2016).Millionsmore are purchasing ACA-compliant, “off-exchange”
plans directly from insurers. The ACA has had a major impact on govern-
ment insurance programs, with Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) enrollment increasing by over 14million persons between
July 2013 andDecember 2015 (CMS2016). Even states that did not expand
Medicaid saw a “woodwork” effect, with program enrollment increasing
on average by 10 percent (Buettgens, Blumberg, and Holahan 2015; CMS
2016). Additionally, the ACA’s provision allowing children up to age
twenty-six to stay on their parents’ health plans has substantially boosted
coverage rates among that group.
These impressive gains are a testament to the demand for coverage
among the uninsured and to the strengths of the ACA’s multipronged
expansion model. Put simply, the ACA’s major mechanisms for expanding
coverage are working. The results are all the more impressive given that
nineteen states have not expandedMedicaid, leaving nearly 3 million low-
income adults in a coverage gap (Garfield and Damico 2016). Were it not
for the 2012 Supreme Court decision that made Medicaid expansion
optional for the states, the decrease in the uninsured population would be
even larger. For all the controversy surrounding it, all the initial adminis-
trative missteps and technical snafus, all the predictions that it would fail,
the ACA’s substantial insurance expansion in a relatively short period is a
remarkable achievement.
At the same time, the ACA’s record to date underscores its limits. The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2015) had estimated that 21 million
enrollees would be in the insurancemarketplaces in 2016; while enrollment
has been good, it has fallen far short of initial projections. The ACA
explicitly aims to attain “near universal coverage,” an ambitious, if impre-
cise, goal. Obamacare is moving the United States closer to that standard,
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but for now the universalism or actual near universalism that characterizes
other rich democracies remains far away. The CDC estimates that about 29
million US residents lacked insurance in 2015; one out of eleven US resi-
dents remain uninsured (Martinez, Cohen, and Zammitti 2016). Not sur-
prisingly, the proportion of Americans without coverage remains much
higher in states that have not adopted theACA’sMedicaid expansion than in
states that have expanded Medicaid (Long et al. 2015). Even after health
insurance exchanges reach their projected maximum enrollment in 2018,
the CBO (2015) estimates that there will be 27 million uninsured persons.
Despite the ACA’s advances, a sizable uninsured population will continue
to live in the United States in coming years.
That population comprises diverse social strata, from unauthorized
immigrants to low-income adults living in states that have not expanded
Medicaid and young adults who choose not to purchase coverage. The
limits of Obamacare’s scope of insurance coverage reflect, in large part,
political compromises made to pass the law. Controversy surrounding
unauthorized immigrants ensured that the ACA did not provide any new
coverage options for them. The individual mandate is not really a mandate
since persons can opt out of it by paying a modest tax penalty and the
Internal Revenue Service has only a limited ability to enforce collection
of those payments. Preliminary data showed that 7.5 million Americans
were subject to the penalty (or, as ACA proponents prefer, the individual
shared responsibility provision) in 2014 and paid an average of only $200
(Mazur 2015). The penalty rose substantially thereafter, averaging $969
for households in 2016, though for many persons it still costs much less
than the price of purchasing insurance (Rae et al. 2015).
Limited by budgetary considerations that constrained the law’s archi-
tects, the ACA’s subsidies to help the uninsured afford insurance coverage
are partial, leaving many persons (particularly those who make above 200
percent of the federal poverty level [FPL], or about $24,000 for an indi-
vidual) responsible for considerable premium payments. The ACA has
struggled to enroll persons who are not very low-income (Blumberg and
Holahan 2015). While 76 percent of eligible individuals making between
100 percent and 150 percent FPL are enrolled in the exchanges, only 30
percent of eligible persons earning between 201 percent and 250 percent
FPLand16percent of those between301percent and400percent FPLhave
signed up for exchange plans (Avalere Health 2015a). Moreover, many of
the policies available for purchase through the ACA’s health insurance
marketplaces are high-deductible plans. In the thirty-seven states using
Healthcare.gov, the annual average deductible for an individually pur-
chased exchange plan at the silver level—the plan type with the highest
Oberlander - Implementing the Affordable Care Act 813
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhppl/article-pdf/41/4/803/435305/803Oberlander.pdf
by UNIV NC CHAPEL HILL user
on 14 August 2019
enrollment—was $2,559 in 2015, with average out-of-pocket limits
exceeding $5,800 (Claxton and Panchal 2015). Such high deductibles and
co-payments impose a significant financial burden on persons with modest
incomes and deter their enrollment into ACA plans. Substantial cost-
sharing subsidies are available for Americans making up to 200 percent
FPL to reduce those costs, but others face very high out-of-pocket costs on
top of their premiums. Put another way, the ACA’s record to date suggests
that the law is underfunded, with insufficient subsidies for many persons it
aims to cover (Blumberg and Holahan 2015). The question is not just
whether people have insurance but what kind of insurance they have. The
ACA’s health insurance vision is neither universal in coverage nor com-
prehensive in its protections against medical care costs (Oberlander 2014a).
Signing up new enrollees for coverage through the insurance market-
places has been a vast undertaking. There is widevariation across the states
in what percentage of eligible persons are obtaining insurance under the
ACA (including those who are eligible for tax credits, legal residents who
are otherwise uninsured and lack access to employer-sponsored coverage,
and individuals who purchase non-group coverage) (KFF 2015b). In
Florida, an estimated 59 percent of eligible enrollees have coverage
through theACAmarketplace, while that figure stands at only 20 percent in
Iowa (KFF 2016b). Overall, through December 2015, ACA exchanges had
enrolled only 41 percent of the eligible population nationally (KFF 2016b).
Similarly, there is large interstate variation in the proportion of persons
eligible for premiumsubsidieswhohave signedup forACAcoverage through
the marketplaces. Nationally, as of September 2015, 56 percent of persons
eligible for financial assistance had enrolled in ACA plans (KFF 2016c).
In other words, millions of Americans who could obtain subsidized
insurance are not purchasing it. Focus group and survey data (PerryUndem
Research/Communications 2014; RWJF et al. 2015) indicate that many of
the remaining uninsured regard ACA coverage as unaffordable. That judg-
ment partly reflects ongoing confusion about the availability of subsidies to
help defray premium costs. Over six years after the law’s enactment, its
benefits are still amystery tomany—35 percent ofAmericans do not know
that the ACA provides financial assistance to low- and moderate-income
uninsured persons to help themobtain coverage, and 40percent donot know
that the law gives states the option to expand Medicaid eligibility (KFF
2015a). It also reflects the reality that for many Americans, ACA insurance
plans are neither cheap nor comprehensive, even with subsidies. The ACA
has, for persons with modest incomes, a serious affordability issue. Caught
between inadequate subsidies and a weak penalty, and confronted with a
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complex enrollment system, many uninsured Americans have yet to take
up coverage. Nor has the ACA erased another long-standing barrier to
expanded coverage—that many persons who qualify for government
insurance programs do not sign up, even with no or nominal premiums and
cost-sharing requirements. As of 2015, 9 million Americans, adults and
children, were eligible for but not enrolled in Medicaid and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (Garfield et al. 2016). That gap stands as another
sobering testament to America’s convoluted insurance arrangements.
Complexity
Complexity is itself a major challenge for ACA implementation. Rather
than creating a new health insurance structure, the ACA builds on the
existing fragmented, labyrinthine nonsystem. The ACA addresses holes in
that system by layering new policies, regulations, mandates, and institu-
tions on top of the prevailing patchwork. That policy choice did not signify
a substantive endorsement of the prevailing (dis)order but instead reflected
a political calculation about passing reform. Other simpler, more straight-
forward plans, from Medicare for All to Senators Ron Wyden and Robert
Bennett’s Healthy Americans Act, were dismissed by the Obama admin-
istration and congressional Democratic leadership. They were seen as
overly disruptive of the status quo, rendering them legislatively infeasible.
As noted earlier, the ACA’s enactment was a major political triumph for
the patchwork approach to health reform.Moreover, the ACA’s impressive
coverage gains demonstrate that the law’s multipronged strategy is not a
barrier to making substantial improvements in access to health insurance.
Perhaps most importantly, there was no way to pass a major coverage
expansion during 2009–10 without building on existing arrangements.
Still, there have been considerable costs to that complexity. The devil is
in the details, and some of the ACA’s details have weakened efforts to
provide meaningful health insurance. One such example is the aforemen-
tioned “family glitch.” Workers whose employer-sponsored plans cost
more than 9.5 percent of income are allowed to go into the health insurance
marketplaces and receive subsidized coverage. TheObama administration,
much to the consternation of consumer advocates, interpreted the statute to
mean that affordability would be measured only in terms of the premium
costs of an individual plan, rather than the cost for family coverage. That
means that workers whose employers heavily subsidize individual but not
family coverage do not qualify for subsidized marketplace insurance,
leaving many employees without affordable coverage options for family
members (Jost and Pollock 2015).
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Elsewhere the ACA’s reality has not always lived up to its promise. The
law aimed to provide comprehensive coverage for maternity care—before
the ACA, a majority of plans on the individual insurance market excluded
such benefits. It made maternity services one of the ACA’s essential health
benefits that health plans on the exchange must cover. However, because
pregnancy is not one of the specified qualifying life events that allow
people to enroll in subsidized marketplace coverage outside of the annual
enrollment period, some pregnant women do not have access to afford-
able plans with maternity services (Postolowski 2014). Other women are
enrolled in employer-sponsored or individually purchased health plans
that lack maternity care benefits because they are “grandfathered.” Such
grandfathered plans operated prior to the ACA and are exempt frommany
of the law’s benefit requirements as long as they do not subsequently make
any major changes (Postolowski 2014). Grandfathered plans do not have
to provide enrollees with coverage for no-cost preventive services and
can maintain annual dollar caps on spending for their enrollees. For many
Americans, their access to someACAbenefits is thus restricted, though the
proportion of plans with grandfathered status is declining over time. Self-
insured plans in the small-group market are similarly exempt from some
ACA regulations. Other loopholes in ACA rules have permitted businesses
to offer “bare bones” policies that provide little protection to the ostensibly
insured.And the law’s employermandate has a host of problems, including
convoluted rules, that have led to its delayed implementation and raised
concerns over labormarket distortions (Blumberg,Holahan, andBuettgens
2014; Jost 2014b).
Meanwhile, over 2 million persons who were enrolled in ACA plans on
the insurance exchanges in 2015 and were eligible for cost-sharing reduc-
tions did not receive them because they chose a plan that did not qualify
for these subsidies (Avalere Health 2015c). And “300,000 low-income
taxpayers reported a payment [as part of the individual mandate penalty
for not obtaining insurance] when they should have claimed a health care
coverage exemption” (Mazur 2015). The law’s complex arrangements for
premium tax credits requires estimates of enrollees’ forthcoming income
and then, subsequently, reconciliation of their actual income with the sub-
sidies they received (Jost and Pollock 2015). Over 3 million uninsured
persons are eligible for subsidized coverage in themarketplaces thatwould
either require no premium or charge a premium less than the penalty they
owe for not having insurance (Rae et al. 2015).
None of this catalog is to take away from the ACA’s considerable
achievements in expanding access to insurance. It is to say, however, that
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some of the law’s consumer protections are not as robust or universally
applicable as often presumed. Implementing a coverage systemas complex
as this creates numerous challenges. There are costs to the ACA’s approach
of layering new rules on top of the preexisting insurance patchwork.While
the ACA addresses many gaps in American medical care, it has significant
gaps of its own.
The Public Divide
The ACA did not become law because of a strong public mandate. When
Obama signed the ACA on March 23, 2010, 50 percent of Americans
opposed the law and 42 percent favored it (Huffington Post, n.d.). Demo-
crats could expect, though, that its support would climb over time. There
was the precedent of Medicare. Furthermore, the Obamacare debate had
been clouded by the threat of mythic “death panels” and “pulling the
plug on grandma.” Once it was law, ACA proponents could reason, those
specters would recede as Americans experienced the law’s real benefits.
The adoption of subsidized coverage for the uninsured, Medicaid expan-
sion, regulation of private insurers, the abolition of lifetime and annual
caps on insurance benefits, limits on insurers’ administrative expenses
and establishment of consumer rebates, enhanced Medicare benefits, new
requirements for insurers to cover preventive and maternity services, the
option for parents to keep their children on coverage until age twenty-
six—all of these measures and more would make Americans’ health care
more secure and build a broad political constituency for Obamacare
(Jacobs and Mettler 2011).
Those benefits all have gone into effect, affecting tens of millions of
Americans. Moreover, national health care spending growth—an area
beyond this article’s scope—has continued to rise at remarkably moderate
rates, defying predictions by critics that Obamacare would drive up costs.
Initial premium prices for health plans offered through the insurance
marketplaceswere significantly lower than anticipated and, for the second-
lowest-cost silver plan that is the benchmark for subsidies, grew only 2
percent between 2014 and 2015, weighted for enrollment (Sheingold,
Nguyen, and Chappel 2015). In 2016, premiums for such plans did rise by
6 percent on average, with widespread state variation, yet most enrollees
in the insurance exchanges receive subsidies that shield them from these
increases (Gabel et al. 2016). The ACA is now projected to cost much
less—$200 billion less during 2015–19 alone—than the CBO (2015)
originally projected in 2010when the lawwas enacted.Medicare spending
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has been, partly due to ACA measures, significantly lower than expected,
reducing the cost-sharing burden on program beneficiaries. Initiatives in
the ACA to reduce hospital readmissions and hospital-acquired infections
have shown promising early results (Blumenthal, Abrams, and Nuzum
2015). And the ACA has not been the “job killer” that some observers
warned about. Through 2014, the ACA had “virtually no adverse effect on
labor force participation, employment, or usual hours worked per week,”
though it remains unclear to what extent, if any, the law is increasing part-
time work (Garrett and Kaestner 2015: 3; 2014).
For all the ACA’s benefits and accomplishments, the decisive turn in
public opinion has not come (Oberlander andWeaver 2015).Over six years
after its enactment, following endless debate over the ACA’s virtues and
vices, the rollout of its core benefits, two elections, advertising that pro-
motes and (mainly) attacks Obamacare, multiple court cases challenging
its legality, and endless debates in Washington and the states, attitudes
about the health reform law have not changed all that much from 2010. In
March 2016, 45 percent of Americans opposed the ACA and 39.5 percent
supported it (Huffington Post, n.d.).
To be sure, those numbers obscure important nuances. Some who show
up in surveys as opposing the ACA actually want more comprehensive
reform. Americans strongly favor core ACA provisions like the prohibition
on insurers excluding coverage of persons with preexisting conditions and
Medicaid expansion (KFF 2014). The ACA’s component parts have always
beenmorepopular than the law itself (Brodie et al. 2010).Only aminority of
the public wants the law repealed. And during 2015 therewas a downtick in
negative perceptions of the ACA, perhaps attributable to the comparatively
trouble-free second open enrollment period and ongoing coverage gains.
Still, public support for the ACA has been underwhelming for an
extended period. That Obamacare rather thanAffordable Care has become
the most common name for the law is itself a sign of the administration’s
problems selling it. It is not clear that the lawwill ever attain the popularity
ofMedicare andSocial Security. TheACA, after all, is not a single program
but a collection of policies, regulations, and subsidies that affects different
groups of Americans in different ways at different times. The lack of a
coherent programmatic identitymakes it hard for theACA to build the kind
of coalition that Medicare and Social Security enjoy. Many Americans are
benefiting from theACAbut do not know they are beneficiaries. TheObama
administration has not succeeded in persuading many insured persons,
including Medicare beneficiaries, that the law’s insurance protections and
enhanced benefits are improving their health security. In March 2015, only
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19 percent of Americans in a Kaiser Family Foundation survey (2015a)
said that the ACA helped them or their family directly, while 22 percent
said that it hurt them and 57 percent reported no direct impact.
Partisan polarization is evident in public views of health reform, with
Democrats supporting the law at much higher levels than Republicans and
Republicans more likely to report that the law has hurt them personally
(KFF2014;Oberlander andWeaver 2015). The death panelmyth and other
misconceptions, relatively immune to the truth and correctives, persist
(Nyhan 2010; Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel 2013). In this polarized environ-
ment, the negative (real and imagined) experiences and consequences of
the ACA are amplified, with every bad development in health care blamed
on Obamacare regardless of whether the law is actually responsible—a
political condition that might be termed “Obamacare-itis.” For example,
the thinning out of private health insurance, a trend that predates the ACA,
may be impacting public perceptions: among those who say the law has
directly hurt them, themost cited reason is that it has increased their health
care or insurance costs (KFF 2015c). Meanwhile, the ACA’s myriad ben-
efits and achievements are obscured (though its advocates also tend to
overattribute positive developments to the law).
Consequently, a large gap between the ACA’s performance and per-
ception has developed. The law is working well in crucial respects, yet
public support remains tepid. Stronger public support for Obamacare
would, of course, not solve its implementation challenges. But it could
raise the electoral costs of opposing the law, perhaps persuade some pol-
iticians to rethink their recidivist stances, and solidify the ACA’s standing
as beyond repeal. Nonetheless, the barriers to broad public support for the
ACA are unlikely to disappear soon and additional challenges await.
Congress has delayed onset of a controversial measure, the Cadillac tax on
private insurance, beloved by health policy experts but unlikely to win
many fans among insured Americans, from 2018 to 2020. If it actually is
implemented, the Cadillac tax could reduce public support for the ACA as
it exacerbates underinsurance. Employers are already blaming the tax,
whose impact will accelerate over time, for decisions to cut back on cov-
erage and shift costs to workers.
Beyond Utopia
The ACA’s implementation has been rocky. It has faced substantial state
resistance, and partisanship has engulfed health care reform. Legal chal-
lenges to the ACA have proved formidable. The 2012 Supreme Court
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decision on Medicaid expansion and subsequent state decisions to reject
expansion seriously damaged the ACA’s platform to cover low-income
uninsured adults. The 2013 rollout of HealthCare.gov and the federal
health insurance marketplace was disastrous. The cancellation of indi-
vidual insurance policies contradicted the president’s promise that the
ACAwould allow Americans to keep existing coverage. Public opinion on
the ACA remains divided, and confusion about what Obamacare does and
does not do persists.
And yet the ACA has overcome those pitfalls. Obamacare has delivered
on its promise to make insurance more affordable and accessible. Twenty
million Americans have gained insurance coverage. Millions more have
better insurance benefits and more secure coverage today because of
the ACA’s market reforms. Americans with preexisting conditions cannot
be denied coverage or charged higher premiums. Insurers can no longer
impose benefit limits on persons with serious, expensive medical condi-
tions. Personswith conditions frommental illness to cancer andmanymore
no longer face discrimination by insurance companies. Many of thosewho
have gained insurance coverage through the ACA experience improved
financial security as a result. The American health care system in 2016 is
more just than it was in 2010.
The ACA has significant shortcomings. But given the constraints of a
fragmented political system that defies radical reform, compels compro-
mise, and is currently beset by extraordinary levels of partisan and ideo-
logical polarization, and the imperviousness of a fragmented health care
system that is resistant to bold departures from the status quo, the ACA is,
as an approach to health reform, probably as good as it gets in the United
States. Simply put, making reform work in this environment is incredibly
hard. The first six years of ACA implementation have shown that it is
possible tomakemeaningful changes in Americanmedical care, including
amajor expansion of access to health insurance, and also revealed the limits
of change. The ACA is not utopia. It is what substantial health care reform
looks like in the United States.
The Path Ahead
The question is what health reformwill look like in coming years. Two key
issues that loom in the ACA’s future are the ongoing trajectory of health
insurance coverage expansion and a changing political environment.
It is unclear how much further the ACA can reduce the uninsured pop-
ulation absent reforms to strengthen its coverage provisions. Even with
an increase in the individual mandate penalty, sign-ups for the ACA
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marketplaces rose only from 11.7 million in 2015 to 12.7 million in 2016
(Avalere 2015d;Levitt et al. 2016). Enrollment growth in comingyearswill
require signing up persons with modest incomes, a population that the
insurance exchanges have struggled to attract to date because of inadequate
subsidies (Avalere Health 2015a). Even as the penalty for not obtaining
insurance rises, for many persons in this income range it will remain less
expensive than buying the cheapest plan on the exchange (Avalere Health
2015b). And while so far a small percentage of Americans have paid
modest penalties for not obtaining health insurance, as those numbers rise
so too could the political fallout. The stability (or potential instability) of
the health insurance marketplaces, including insurer participation and
premium rates, is another crucial issue, especially given thatmany insurers
have reported losses on their ACA business, including United Healthcare,
which has announced plans to withdraw from most of the state exchanges
in which it had participated. The forthcoming expiration of policies that
stabilize ACA marketplace premiums could, unless there is federal inter-
vention tomaintain them, inject substantial volatility into themarketplaces
(Laszewski 2015).
The ACA’s political future is uncertain and highly dependent on the
outcome of the 2016 elections. If Democrats win the White House and
gain Congressional majorities, they could try to strengthen the ACA by
addressing its affordability issues, continuing premium stabilization poli-
cies, seeking ways to increase enrollment, and encouraging state efforts to
create public plans to compete against private insurers on themarketplaces.
However, if a Republican wins the presidency and the GOP holds major-
ities in the House and Senate, the ACA faces a much more perilous future.
The GOP could use budget reconciliation to repeal many of the ACA’s
core provisions, though not the entire law. Reconciliation would enable
Republicans to circumvent the requirements for a Senate supermajority
to end a filibuster; they could make changes in Obamacare with a simple
majority. But it is unclear what the GOP might advance as a replace-
ment plan for the ACA or whether Republicans want to incur the high
political risks—including de-insuringmillions ofAmericans—associated
with repeal. Too much has changed in American medical care, too many
Americans are benefiting from the ACA, and too little public support for
total repeal exists to go back to status quo ante (Oberlander 2014b). Still,
even absent repeal, a Republican president committed to its dismantling
could do much to undermine the ACA’s implementation and stall further
progress. The ACA has had a troubled rollout with a president in office
whowants the law towork. Imagine the possibilities if it operates under a
president who wants it to fail.
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In short, six years after its historic enactment, the politics of ACA
implementation remain volatile. Health care reform has already achieved
much, but there is a long way to go.
n n n
Jonathan Oberlander is chair of the Department of Social Medicine and professor
in the School of Medicine, and professor of health policy and management in the
Gillings School of Global Public Health at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. He is author of The Political Life of Medicare (2003) and coeditor of The Social
Medicine Reader (2005). His recent work has explored Medicare, the Children’s
Health Insurance Program, the role of Congress in health care cost control, physician
payment reform, and the politics of implementing the Affordable Care Act.
References
Avalere Health. 2015a. “Exchanges Struggle to Enroll Consumers as Income
Increases.” Washington, DC: Avalere Health. avalere-health-production.s3
.amazonaws.com/uploads/pdfs/1427298489_20150325_Exchange_Participation
_by_Income_Final.pdf.
Avalere Health. 2015b. “Individual Mandate Penalty May Be Too Low to Attract
Middle-Income Individuals to Enroll in Exchanges.” Washington, DC: Avalere
Health. avalere-health-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pdfs/1429893909
_20150424_Mandate_Penalty_vs_Premiums_FINAL.pdf.
Avalere Health. 2015c. “More than 2 Million Exchange Enrollees Forgo Cost-Sharing
Assistance.” Washington, DC: Avalere Health. avalere-health-production.s3
.amazonaws.com/uploads/pdfs/1439993201_20150819_Avalere_CSR_FINAL.pdf.
Avalere Health. 2015d. “State-Based Exchanges Saw Higher Attrition from 2014 to
2015 than Federally Facilitated Exchanges.” Washington, DC: Avalere Health.
avalere-health-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pdfs/1428517634_20150407
_Exchange_Renewals_Insights.pdf.
Bagley, Nicholas. 2015. “Three Words and the Future of the Affordable Care Act.”
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 40, no. 3: 589-97.
Blumberg, Linda, and John Holahan. 2015. After King v. Burwell: Next Steps for the
Affordable Care Act. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000328-After-King-v.-Burwell-Next-Steps
-for-the-Affordable-Care-Act.pdf.
Blumberg, Linda, John Holahan, and Matthew Buettgens. 2014. Why Not Just Elim-
inate the Employer Mandate? Washington, DC: Urban Institute. www.urban.org
/publications/413117.html.
822 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhppl/article-pdf/41/4/803/435305/803Oberlander.pdf
by UNIV NC CHAPEL HILL user
on 14 August 2019
Blumenthal, David, Melinda Abrams, and Rachel Nuzum. 2015. “The Affordable
Care Act at Five Years.” New England Journal of Medicine 372, no. 25: 2451–58.
Brodie,Mollyann, DrewAltman, Claudia Deane, Sasha Buscho, and Elizabeth Hamel.
2010. “Liking the Pieces, Not the Package: Contradictions in Public Opinion during
Health Reform.” Health Affairs 29, no. 6: 1125–30.
Brown, Lawrence. 2011. “The Elements of Surprise: HowHealth Reform Happened.”
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 36, no. 3: 419–27.
Buettgens, Matthew, Linda Blumberg, and John Holahan. 2015. The Combined Effect
of Not Expanding Medicaid and Losing Marketplace Assistance. Washington, DC:
Urban Institute.
CBO (Congressional Budget Office). 2015. Insurance Coverage Provisions of the
Affordable Care Act—CBO’s March 2015 Baseline. Washington, DC: CBO.
Claxton, Gary, and Nirmita Panchal. 2015. “Cost-Sharing Subsidies in Federal Mar-
ketplace Plans.”Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation. kff.org/health-reform
/issue-brief/cost-sharing-subsidies-in-federal-marketplace-plans.
Clemans-Cope, Lisa, and Nathaniel Anderson. 2015. “Quick Take: Health Insurance
Policy CancellationsWere Uncommon in 2014.”Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
http://hrms.urban.org/quicktakes/Health-Insurance-Policy-Cancellations-Were
-Uncommon-in-2014.html.
CMS (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services). 2016. “Medicaid & CHIP:
December 2015 Monthly Applications, Eligibility Determinations and Enrollment
Report.” Baltimore: Department of Health and Human Services, February 29.
Cohen, Robin A., and Michael E. Martinez. 2015. “Health Insurance Coverage: Early
Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, January–March
2015.” Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for
Health Statistics. www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201508.pdf.
Cohn, Jonathan. 2010. “How They Did It: The Inside Story of Health Care Reform’s
Triumph.” New Republic, June 10, 14–25.
Feder, Judith. 2014. The Inevitability of Disruption in Health Reform. Washington,
DC: Urban Institute. www.urban.org/publications/413027.html.
Gabel, Jon R., Heidi Whitmore, Adrienne Call, Matthew Green, Rebecca Oran, and
Sam Stromberg. 2016. “Modest Changes in 2016 Health Insurance Marketplace
Premiums and Insurer Participation.” The Commonwealth Fund (blog), January
28. http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/jan/2016-health
-insurance-marketplace-premiums.
Garfield, Rachel, and Anthony Damico. 2016. The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor
Adults in States That Do Not Expand Medicaid: An Update. Menlo Park, CA:
Kaiser Family Foundation.
Garfield, Rachel, Anthony Damico, Cynthia Cox, Gary Claxton, and Larry Levitt.
2016. New Estimates for ACA Coverage among the Uninsured. Menlo Park, CA:
Kaiser Family Foundation.
Garrett, Bowen, and Robert Kaestner. 2014. “Little Evidence of the ACA Increasing
Part-Time Work So Far.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute. www.urban.org
/research/publication/little-evidence-aca-increasing-part-time-work-so-far.
Oberlander - Implementing the Affordable Care Act 823
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhppl/article-pdf/41/4/803/435305/803Oberlander.pdf
by UNIV NC CHAPEL HILL user
on 14 August 2019
Garrett, Bowen, and Robert Kaestner. 2015. “Recent Evidence on the ACA and
Employment: Has the ACA Been a Job Killer?” Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
www.urban.org/research/publication/recent-evidence-aca-and-employment-has
-aca-been-job-killer.
Hacker, Jacob S. 1996. The Road to Nowhere: TheGenesis of President Clinton’s Plan
for Health Security. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hacker, Jacob S. 2011. “Why Reform Happened.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy
and Law 36, no. 3: 437–41.
Huffington Post. n.d. “Obama Health Care Law Favor/Oppose.” HuffPost Pollster.
elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/us-health-bill (accessed March 9, 2016).
Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Suzanne Mettler. 2011. “Why Public Opinion Changes: The
Implications for Health and Health Policy.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and
Law 36, no. 6: 917–33.
Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Theda Skocpol. 2010. Health Care Reform and American
Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know. Rev. and updated ed. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Johnson, Haynes, and David S. Broder. 1997. The System: The American Way of
Politics at the Breaking Point. Boston: Little, Brown.
Jones, David K., Katharine W. V. Bradley, and Jonathan Oberlander. 2014. “Pascal’s
Wager: Health Insurance Exchanges, Obamacare, and the Republican Dilemma.”
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 39, no. 1: 97–137.
Jost, Timothy. 2014a. “Implementing Health Reform: Four Years Later.” Health
Affairs 33, no. 1: 7–10.
Jost, Timothy. 2014b. “Repeal, and Replace, the Employer Mandate.” Health Affairs
(blog), June 4. healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/06/04/repeal-and-replace-the-employer
-mandate.
Jost, Timothy. 2016. “The House and the ACA: A Lawsuit over Cost-Sharing
Reductions.” New England Journal of Medicine 374, no. 1: 5–7.
Jost, Timothy S., and Harold Pollock. 2015.Key Proposals to Strengthen the Affordable
Care Act. New York: The Century Foundation. http://tcf.org/assets/downloads
/TCF_KeyProposalstoStrengthenACA.pdf
KFF (Kaiser Family Foundation). 2014. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: December
2014. files.kff.org/attachment/topline-methodology-kaiser-health-policy-news-index
-december-2014.
KFF (Kaiser Family Foundation). 2015a. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: March 2015.
kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-march-2015.
KFF (Kaiser Family Foundation). 2015b. Marketplace Enrollment as a Share of the
Potential Marketplace Population. kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/marketplace
-enrollment-as-a-share-of-the-potential-marketplace-population-2015.
KFF (Kaiser Family Foundation). 2015c. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: December
2015. http://kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-december
-2015/.
KFF (Kaiser Family Foundation). 2016a. Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion
Decisions. February 24. http://kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the
-medicaid-expansion-decision/.
824 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhppl/article-pdf/41/4/803/435305/803Oberlander.pdf
by UNIV NC CHAPEL HILL user
on 14 August 2019
KFF (Kaiser Family Foundation). 2016b. Marketplace Plan Selections as a Share of
the Potential Marketplace Population. http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator
/marketplace-plan-selections-as-a-share-of-the-potential-marketplace-population/.
KFF (Kaiser Family Foundation). 2016c. Marketplace Enrollees Receiving Financial
Assistance as a Share of the Subsidy-Eligible Population. http://kff.org/health
-reform/state-indicator/marketplace-enrollees-eligible-for-financial-assistance-as
-a-share-of-subsidy-eligible-population/.
Lake Research Partners and the Herndon Alliance. 2009. “The Positive Care for
Health Care Reform and Responding to Attacks.” Washington, DC.
Laszewski, Robert. 2015. “The King v. Burwell Decision.” Health Care Policy and
Marketplace Review (blog), June 2.
Lee, Frances E. 2009. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the
U.S. Senate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Levitt, Larry, Gary Claxton, AnthonyDamico, and Cynthia Cox. 2016. Assessing ACA
Marketplace Enrollment. Kaiser Family Foundation,March 4. http://kff.org/private
-insurance/issue-brief/assessing-aca-marketplace-enrollment/.
Long, Sharon K., Michael Karpman, Genevieve M. Kenney, Stephen Zuckerman,
Douglas Wissoker, Adele Shartzer, Nathaniel Anderson, and Katherine Hemp-
stead. 2015. Taking Stock: Gains in Health Insurance Coverage under the ACA as
of March 2015. April 16. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. hrms.urban.org/briefs
/Gains-in-Health-Insurance-Coverage-under-the-ACA-as-of-March-2015.html.
Luca, Kevin, Sabrina Corlette, and Ashley Williams. 2014. “The Extended ‘Fix’ for
Canceled Health Insurance Policies: Latest State Action.” The Commonwealth Fund
Blog, November 21. http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2014
/jun/adoption-of-the-presidents-extended-fix.
Marmor, Theodore, and Jonathan Oberlander. 2011. “The Patchwork: Health Reform,
American Style.” Social Science and Medicine 72, no. 2: 125–28.
Martinez, Michael E., Robin A. Cohen, and Emily Zammitti. 2016. “Health Insurance
Coverage: Early Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey,
January-September 2015.” Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
NationalCenter forHealth Statistics. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease
/insur201602.pdf.
Mazur, Mark J. 2015. “Update on the ACA and Tax Filing Season.” US Department
of the Treasury. Treasury Notes (blog), July 17. www.treasury.gov/connect/blog
/Pages/Update-on-the-ACA-and-Tax-Filing-Season-.aspx.
McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America:
The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
McDonough, John E. 2011. Inside National Health Reform. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Mechanic, David. 1994. Inescapable Decisions: The Imperatives of Health Reform.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Nyhan, Brendan. 2010. “Why the ‘Death Panel’ Myth Wouldn’t Die: Misinformation
in the Health Care Reform Debate.” Forum 8, no. 1: 1–24.
Nyhan, Brendan, Jason Reifler, and Peter A. Ubel. 2013. “The Hazards of Correcting
Myths about Health Care Reform.” Medical Care 51, no. 2: 127–32.
Oberlander - Implementing the Affordable Care Act 825
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhppl/article-pdf/41/4/803/435305/803Oberlander.pdf
by UNIV NC CHAPEL HILL user
on 14 August 2019
Oberlander, Jonathan. 2010. “Long Time Coming: Why Health Reform Finally
Passed.” Health Affairs 29, no. 6: 1112–16.
Oberlander, Jonathan. 2014a. “Between Liberal Aspirations and Market Forces:
Obamacare’s Precarious Balancing Act.” Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 42,
no. 4: 31–41.
Oberlander, Jonathan. 2014b. “Unraveling Obamacare: Can Congress and the
Supreme Court Undo Health Care Reform?” New England Journal of Medicine
371, no. 26: 2445–47.
Oberlander, Jonathan, and R. Kent Weaver. 2015. “Unraveling from Within: The
Affordable Care Act and Self-Undermining Policy Feedbacks.” Forum 13, no. 1:
37–62.
PerryUndem Research/Communications. 2014. The Affordable Care Act’s First
Enrollment Period: Why Did Some People Enroll . . . and Others Not?Washington,
DC: PerryUndem Research/Communications.
Postolowski, Christina. 2014. Without Maternity Coverage: The Need for Special
Enrollment in the Health Insurance Marketplaces during Pregnancy. Washington,
DC: Young Invincibles. younginvincibles.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Without
-Maternity-Coverage-1.5.15_4.pdf.
Quadagno, Jill. 2014. “Right-Wing Conspiracy? Socialist Plot? The Origins of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and
Law 39, no. 1: 35–56.
Rae, Matthew, Anthony Damico, Cynthia Cox, Gary Claxton, and Larry Levitt. 2015.
The Cost of the Individual Mandate Penalty for the Remaining Uninsured. Menlo
Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation.
RWJF (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation), GMMB, PerryUndem Research/
Communications. 2015. Understanding the Uninsured Now. http://www.rwjf.org
/content/dam/farm/reports/surveys_and_polls/2015/rwjf420854.
Rose, Shanna. 2015. “Opting in, OptingOut: The Politics of StateMedicaid Expansion.”
Forum 13, no. 1: 63–82.
Sheingold, Steven, Nguyen Nguyen, and Andre Chappel. 2015. “Competition and
Choice in the Health Insurance Marketplaces, 2014–2015: Impact on Premiums.”
ASPE Issue Brief.Washington, DC: USDepartment of Health andHuman Services.
Shor, Boris, and Nolan McCarty. 2011. “The Ideological Mapping of American
Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 105, no. 3: 530–51.
Skocpol, Theda. 1996. Boomerang: Health Care Reform and the Turn against Gov-
ernment. New York: Norton.
Sommers, Benjamin D. 2014. “Insurance Cancellations in Context: Stability of
Coverage in the Nongroup Market Prior to Reform.” Health Affairs 33, no. 5: 1–8.
Starr, Paul. 2011. Remedy and Reaction: The Peculiar American Struggle over Health
Care Reform. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tuohy, Carolyn Hughes. 2011. “American Health Reform in Comparative Perspec-
tive: Big Bang, Blueprint, or Mosaic?” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
36, no. 3: 571–76.
826 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhppl/article-pdf/41/4/803/435305/803Oberlander.pdf
by UNIV NC CHAPEL HILL user
on 14 August 2019
